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OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Marilyn Huertero appeals an order of the District Court dismissing her civil action 
arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). On the unusual facts of this case, we 
conclude that the District Court erred. Accordingly, we will reverse and remand. 
I 
 In 1946 Congress passed the FTCA, which allows private parties to sue employees 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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of the federal government in defined circumstances. In this appeal, there is no dispute that 
Huertero had a right to file a medical malpractice action under the FTCA against her 
obstetrician, Dr. Adam Repole. The sole question is whether her suit was timely.  
 The FTCA required Huertero to present her claim to the appropriate federal 
agency—here, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—within two years 
of its accrual. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Unaware that Dr. Repole (a private practitioner 
working at a private hospital) was caring for Huertero pursuant to a federal program, 
Huertero’s counsel sued Repole in New Jersey state court on February 14, 2012, the day 
before the state’s two-year statute of limitations was to expire. Because Dr. Repole was 
deemed a federal employee at all times relevant to the case, Huertero had sued Repole in 
the wrong forum and the two-year window she had to present her FTCA claim to HHS 
had closed.  
This error was not fatal to Huertero’s case, however, because the Westfall Act—
Congress’s 1988 amendment to the FTCA—established a procedure by which an FTCA 
action that is filed in the wrong forum (such as the state court here) will be removed by 
the Attorney General to federal district court, at which point the United States is 
substituted as defendant, the case is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies, and the plaintiff gets a second chance to file the FTCA claim with the 
appropriate federal agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). Critical to this appeal, the Westfall 
Act contains a tolling provision (known as its “savings clause”), which states that a 
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plaintiff’s FTCA claim will not be time-barred as long as it: (1) would have been timely 
had it been filed on the date that the wrongly filed action was brought; and (2) is 
presented to the correct federal agency within 60 days of the federal district court’s 
dismissal of the wrongly filed action. Id. § 2679(d)(5).  
 Thus, for a tort action to avoid dismissal under the FTCA statute of limitations 
after it was mistakenly filed in state court, the plaintiff must have: (1) filed her state court 
action within two years of the alleged injury; (2) presented her FTCA claim to the correct 
federal agency within 60 days of the removal and dismissal of the wrongly filed state 
court action; and (3) if denied by the agency, appealed to federal district court within six 
months.  
 Huertero satisfied all three requirements, but there is a complication: Instead of 
waiting for the process contemplated by the Westfall Act to unfold, her counsel jumped 
the gun and filed an administrative claim with HHS on May 9, 2012, which was more 
than two years after the claim accrued but before the Attorney General removed her state 
court action to federal court. As might have been expected, HHS summarily dismissed 
Huertero’s claim as untimely and denied her motion for reconsideration. In the agency’s 
view, which was correct at the time, Huertero’s case was over before it began. 
Meanwhile, after a delay of almost six months, the Attorney General finally removed 
Huertero’s state case to federal court on August 24, 2012 and filed a pro forma motion to 
dismiss three days later. At this point, Huertero’s counsel assumed the District Court 
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would summarily dismiss the case, allowing the claim to be submitted to HHS for 
adjudication on the merits. Accordingly, her counsel failed to file a second federal action 
within six months of HHS’s denial of her motion for reconsideration. 
 The District Court complicated matters by waiting until March 7, 2013 to file an 
order granting the Government’s pro forma motion to dismiss.1 The very next day, 
Huertero filed her second administrative claim with HHS. But having ruled on the case 
previously, HHS returned that claim to her on April 12, 2013. Two months later, 
Huertero filed the federal court action that is the subject of this appeal.  
 Soon after Huertero filed her second action in federal court, the Government filed 
a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted. The Court rightly noted that 
Huertero’s first HHS claim was untimely because it was filed more than two years after 
her alleged injury. And it found her second federal action untimely because it was filed 
more than six months after HHS’s denial of her first administrative claim. As for 
Huertero’s argument that the savings clause of the Westfall Act rendered her claim 
timely, the Court disagreed, finding that Huertero’s second HHS claim was a nullity. “To 
have the Court disregard the First Administrative Action,” the trial judge explained, 
“would ‘allow a claimant an opportunity to reopen the FTCA’s limitations window by the 
                                                 
 1 The District Court’s delay in ruling on the Government’s pro forma motion was 
unfortunate. Had the order issued in the normal course, Huertero probably could have 
filed a timely federal court appeal of HHS’s denial of her motion for reconsideration. 
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simple expedient of re-filing a claim to supplant an earlier, functionally equivalent claim 
on which the window had shut.’” Huertero v. United States, 2014 WL 1744815, at *5 
(D.N.J. April 30, 2014) (quoting Roman-Cancel v. United States, 613 F.3d 37, 42 (1st 
Cir. 2010)). Huertero appealed.   
II2 
 This appeal turns on the question of when the Westfall Act’s savings clause is 
triggered. The District Court concluded that it was triggered when Huertero filed her first 
administrative claim with HHS. Although this is a plausible reading of the law, we 
believe the better reading is that the savings clause was triggered when the District Court 
entered its order dismissing Huertero’s action on March 7, 2013.  
 Before the FTCA was amended, a plaintiff like Huertero who mistakenly sued in 
state court would be without a remedy if the federal statute of limitations expired while 
the case was pending in the wrong forum. See Santos v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 
(3d Cir. 2009). Since the Westfall Act was passed, that once out-of-luck plaintiff may 
now pursue her claim anew as long as: “(A) the claim would have been timely had it been 
filed on the date the underlying civil action was commenced, and (B) the claim is 
presented to the appropriate Federal agency within 60 days after dismissal of the civil 
                                                 
 2 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final judgment under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Seamans v. Temple 
Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 859 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5) (emphasis added). 
 We hold that Huertero satisfied both requirements. First, she filed her underlying 
state court action exactly two years after her claim accrued. Consistent with the Westfall 
Act, the United States was substituted as a party, the case was removed to the District 
Court, the Government moved to dismiss on August 24, 2012, and the District Court 
entered an order dismissing the case on March 7, 2013. Huertero presented her claim to 
HHS the very next day, well within 60 days of that dismissal. And when HHS advised 
her it would not consider that claim, she appealed to the District Court well within the 
FTCA’s six-month limitations period.3 Accordingly, the District Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over Huertero’s case. 
 The Government contends that the Westfall Act’s savings clause requires that a 
claim be presented for the first time to the correct federal agency within 60 days of 
dismissal. On this view, the fact that Huertero presented her claim to the agency within 
60 days of dismissal of her second HHS claim is irrelevant. The Government 
acknowledges that the Westfall Act’s savings clause may be ambiguous, but aptly notes 
that “when the sovereign elects to subject itself to a statute of limitations, the sovereign is 
given the benefit of the doubt if the scope of the statute is ambiguous.” Gov’t Br. 23 
                                                 
 3 To be clear, we hold that the Westfall Act relieves a plaintiff of the FTCA’s 
requirement that she present her claim to the proper agency within two years of accrual, 
not its requirement that she file a district court action within six months of that agency’s 
denial (if such a denial occurs). If Huertero had failed to file her federal action within six 
months of HHS’s April 12, 2013 denial, her claim would have been untimely. 
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(quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 96 (2006)). The Government urges us 
to avoid a policy that would permit plaintiffs to file the same (or nearly the same) 
administrative claim again and again, effectively restarting the clock for filing an FTCA 
claim ad infinitum. See Gov’t Br. 20–23 (citing Roman-Cancel, 613 F.3d at 42 (“[O]ne 
bite at the apple is all that the FTCA’s claim-filing scheme allows.”); and Willis v. United 
States, 719 F.2d 608, 613 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J.) (“If Congress mandated that suit 
be brought within six months after administrative denial of a claim . . . the bar cannot be 
avoided by starting all over again.”)). The Government’s concern in this regard is well-
founded, and we agree with it as a general proposition. When applied to the peculiar facts 
of this case, however, that concern is inapposite. 
 Here, at the time Huertero filed her first HHS claim, the Westfall Act’s savings 
clause was not yet implicated. The Government had not substituted itself as a party, the 
case had not been removed to federal court, the Government had not moved to dismiss 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the District Court had not dismissed 
the case. Rather, the savings clause was triggered when the District Court finally 
dismissed the wrongfully filed state court claim on March 7, 2013 and Huertero presented 
her (second) HHS claim the next day. Unlike in Roman-Cancel, a case upon which the 
Government and the District Court both relied, Huertero’s second HHS claim was not 
“functionally equivalent” to her first administrative claim. See 613 F.3d at 42. Huertero’s 
first HHS claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year limitation period, but her second 
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HHS claim was rendered timely by operation of the Westfall Act’s savings clause.  
Our decision today should not be misconstrued to permit a plaintiff in Huertero’s 
shoes to restart the six-month clock by filing new HHS claims that are “functionally 
equivalent” to earlier claims. Doing so would impermissibly expand the Westfall Act’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity and, as the First Circuit noted in Roman-Cancel, serve “no 
legitimate purpose.” Id. One bite at the apple is, indeed, all that the Westfall Act allows. 
In this unusual case, because Huertero’s first HHS claim preceded the process 
contemplated by the Westfall Act, her first (and only) true bite at the apple came in the 
form of the second claim she filed with HHS. 
III 
 For the reasons stated, we will reverse the order of the District Court and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
